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Abstract
In deep reinforcement learning (RL), adversarial attacks can trick an agent into
unwanted states and disrupt training. We propose a system called Robust Student-
DQN (RS-DQN), which permits online robustness training alongside Q networks,
while preserving competitive performance. We show that RS-DQN can be com-
bined with (i) state-of-the-art adversarial training and (ii) provably robust training
to obtain an agent that is resilient to strong attacks during training and evaluation.
1 Introduction
To ensure Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents behave reliably in the wild, it is important to consider
settings where an adversary aims to interfere with the decisions of the agent. Most recent progress in
RL has focused on handling continuous states via neural networks [1–3]. However, small perturbations
to the input of neural networks can yield vastly different outputs [4]. These perturbations are also
applicable to neural networks deployed in RL, leading to possible security risks [5].
Existing work in the field of robust RL has focused on small, physically plausible perturbations,
discrete states [6, 7], or settings with few inputs [8–12]. These approaches, however, do not scale to
handling gradient-based attacks on large images as studied in supervised classification [4, 13, 14].
In this work we present a new approach for training RL systems to be more robust against adversarial
perturbations. The key idea, shown in Fig. 1, is to split the standard DQN architecture into a policy
(student) network S and a Q network in a way which enables us to robustly train the policy network
S and use it for exploration, while at the same time preserving the standard way of training the Q
network. We then show how to naturally incorporate state-of-the-art defenses developed in supervised
deep learning to the setting of reinforcement learning, by training the student network in two ways:
(i) via adversarial training with methods such as PGD [14] where we generate adversarial states that
decrease the chance the optimal action is selected and use them to train the policy network, and (ii)
via provably robust training with symbolic methods [15, 16] which guarantee the network will select
the right action in a given state despite any possible perturbation (within a range) of that state.
Key Contributions Our main contributions are:
• A novel deep RL algorithm, RS-DQN, designed to be defended with state-of-the-art adver-
sarial training as well as provably robust training.
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• We show that when no attack is present, RS-DQN and DQN obtain similar scores, while in
the presence of attacks, undefended DQNs fail while RS-DQN remains robust.
• An evaluation which demonstrates that RS-DQN can produce an agent that is certifiably
robust to ±1 pixel intensity changes on Atari games with scores comparable to DQN.
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1 Initialize a state s0, weights θQ, θS
2 for i = 0, . . . do
3 Pick action a according to exploration
strategy with network Q(·; θQ) or S(·; θS)
4 Play the game (si+1, r) := G(si, a)
5 Store (si, a, r, si+1) in D
6 if i mod m == 0 then
7 θ−Q := θQ
8 end if
9 Sample a batch D from D
10 Train the underlying Q−Network:
11 L(θQ) :=
∑
(s,a,r,s′)∈D
(Y (θ−Q)−Q(s; θQ)a)2
12 θQ := θQ − ηQ∇θQL(θQ)
13 Train the student S from Q:
14 L(θS) :=
∑
(s,a,r,s′)∈D
LD(s, θQ, θS)
15 θS := θS − ηS∇θSL(θS)
16 end for
No defense Adversarial Training Provably Robust Training
Figure 1: (left) Overview of of RS-DQN. (right) Simplified pseudo-code for DQN and Student-DQN
training. Parts in blue are specific to DQN and parts in orange to Student-DQN .
2 Overview of the RS-DQN Architecture
We now provide an overview of RS-DQN, shown in Fig. 1, and introduce its key ingredients. The top
left part of Fig. 1 shows an agent S playing a game G by observing the current state si and picking an
action a. Based on the state and the action, the game transitions to the next state si+1 with a reward r.
These interactions (si, a, r, si+1) are stored and later used in training. If we were to replace the agent
S (discussed next) with the network Q, we would end up with the standard loop used in DQNs.
A key difference to standard training is the presence of an adversary (w) which introduces perturba-
tions to state si. This can make the agent select sub-optimal actions leading to lower rewards.
Fig. 1 also outlines the training of both networks, S andQ, via the pseudo-code on the right (discussed
shortly), also pictorially illustrated below the play-loop in the gray area. Here, the network Q is
trained in the standard DQN manner, however RS-DQN also trains an additional (student) network
S by distilling Q’s policy. We note that this distillation step is not a defense by itself, however it
does allow us to incorporate state-of-the-art defensive training measures ( ) to S, leading to an
agent S that can robustly interact with the game G and a potential adversary. At a high level, these
defenses (shown at the bottom of the picture) take as input the current state and produce a new
state, either by adding noise (adversarial training) or by defining a symbolic region that captures a
set of perturbations (provably robust training). The split of S and Q is critical for the application
of defenses, as adversarial training directly on Q severely hurts its performance [17, 18] and the
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application of existing provably robust training methods to DQN training is not straightforward. We
discuss defenses in detail later in the paper.
2.1 Deep Reinforcement Learning
We now briefly introduce standard deep Q-Learning and policy distillation. Formally, the goal of
reinforcement learning is to determine a policy for a given game G. The policy represents an agent
and determines which actions it selects. The function Q∗(s, a) describes the expected (discounted)
future reward that an ideal agent can obtain, when it selects an action a in state s. The objective of
Q-Learning [19] is to approximate Q∗ and construct a policy where the agent greedily selects the
action with the maximal value.
Deep Q-Learning In Deep Q-Learning [20, 2], Q∗ is progressively approximated with weights
θQ for a neural network Q(s, a; θQ) — referred to as a deep Q network (DQN). Because Q(s; θQ)
produces a vector of scores for all actions, we write Q(s; θQ)a instead of Q(s, a; θQ).
The pseudo-code in Fig. 1, when the orange boxes are ignored, shows the standard algorithm for
training DQNs. As discussed before, the agent Q interacts with the game G and the resulting state
transition is stored in the experience replay buffer D (lines 3-5). During training, this interaction
involves an exploration strategy e.g., -greedy where the action arg maxaQ(si; θQ)a is chosen with
probability 1 −  and a random action with probability  (for  ∈ [0, 1]). Next, on lines 9-12, the
weights θQ of the DQN are updated via stochastic gradient decent on L(θQ) over a batch D sampled
from D. Integral to the DQN algorithm is the use of a network with lagging weights θ−Q,i = θQ,mb im c
for some m, which is used to calculate the target score Y (θ−Q) = r + γmaxa′ Q(s
′; θ−Q)a′ .
When applying DQN training to video games, one iteration of the for-loop is referred to as a frame.
Playing one game to completion (after which it is reset) is an episode.
Policy Distillation for DQN training It is possible to improve the learned policy in Deep Q-
Learning using Policy Distillation[21]. In this method, a Q-approximation is first learned by the
standard DQN algorithm. New games are then played using Q as a greedy policy and the states s
are recorded. A student network S is then trained offline on these states so to mimic the behavior
of Q. The main application of this method is to train a much smaller network S while retaining the
performance of a previously trained Q network.
In this work we introduce a new method for combining DQN training with Policy Distillation. Unlike
[21], with our method: (i) the learning of the student is performed online, (ii) the student is actively
involved in training as it affects the replay buffer, and (iii) both S and Q use the same architecture.
Concretely, lines 13-15 of Fig. 1 show how to apply policy distillation to train the student network
S from Q, using the distillation loss LD (the exact loss is discussed in §3). The process is also
pictorially illustrated on the left part of the figure. Note that in our setting, we do not require S to be
smaller than Q, we simply need S to be able to apply defensive training methods to it.
Importantly, we remark that while we build on top of policy distillation to produce a robust neural
network, our method is distinct from defensive distillation [22], which is known to be ineffective
in producing robust neural networks [23]. We use policy distillation only as a first step to enabling
strong defenses ( ).
In related work, distillation has also been used device an collaborative RL algorithm [24], allowing
for knowledge transfer between multiple agents playing simultaneously in different environments
with potentially different tasks. Similar to distillation, a DQN algorithm [25] where the agent predicts
when to consult and how to learn from a pre-defined rule-based teacher policy have been proposed.
2.2 Adversarial Attacks & Defenses
It is known that neural networks are susceptible to adversarial perturbations[4]: inputs similar to
genuine ones that lead to different neural network outputs. A common method to compute such
perturbations is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13], which finds an adversarial input x′ s.t.
x′ ∈ Bε(x) = {x′ | ||x− x′||∞ ≤ ε}.
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Here, Bε(x) is an ε-sized L∞ ball around x (not to be confused with the  used for −greedy
exploration). For a network N , input x, and label t, untargeted FGSM is defined as:
x′ = FGSMε(x, t,N) = x+ ε · sign(∇xH(σ(N(x), t)) (1)
whereH(p, t) denotes the standard cross-entropy loss between two probability distributions as used in
classification and t a onehot-encoded distribution. We let σ(·) denote the softmax function, assuming
the outputs of network N to be logits or equivalent scores such as Q-values.
This version of FGSM produces x′ ∈ Bε(x) where x′ has a high chance of not being classified to
label t. Since t is the correct label for x, a successful attack will lead to N treating x as anything but
t — an untargeted attack. Attacks that lead to N treating x′ as a specific t′ are called targeted.
A stronger version of this attack is called Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) [14]. PGDε(x, t,N, k)
denotes an attack where FGSM ε
k
is applied k times successively (with an additional projection step).
We denote it as PGD(x, t,N) in the paper and specify the value for ε and k when needed.
Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in RL In the case of RL, an adversary (w in Fig. 1) can apply
attacks both, at training and testing time. At testing time, untargeted attacks can lower the reward
attained by an RL agent while targeted attacks can be used to guide it into specific states [26]. Attacks
during training can significantly lower the reward the agent is capable of attaining and even prevent
learning altogether [17] — especially in games with high-dimensional inputs such as the frames of
Atari games. Further, this effect can be intentionally used to prevent learning [27].
Adversarial training (AT) [14] — which aims to make a neural network robust to adversarial pertur-
bations — requires to deliberately attack the network during training. While this yields more robust
networks, in Deep Q-Learning it can degrade the performance of the agent to the point where it fails
in learning to play the game. In §4, we show the incorporation of AT as an instantiation of   in Fig. 1.
A version of AT has previously been applied to DQNs, improving its experimental robustness [18]
for low-dimensional inputs, but incurred large reward drops from attacks. Recently, [28] leveraged
techniques from the robustness analysis of neural networks to choose more robust actions from a
trained DQN.
3 Training Student-DQN
We now proceed to formally introduce our Student-DQN architecture. As discussed in §4 later, this
architecture enables the incorporation of constraints into the training process, for example state-of-
the-art adversarial defenses [14, 15]. The algorithm consists of: a standard DQNQ, a student network
S, a loss LD, and learning rates ηQ, ηS . As with standard DQN training, Student-DQN alternates
between playing the game and training.
The pseudo-code in Fig. 1 shows the training of Student-DQN and highlights the differences to
standard DQN training: we use one network for exploration and another for learning the Q-function.
In line 3 in Fig. 1, the exploration is first performed by the student network S, then the Q network
is trained in the standard way (line 9-12) with the learning rate ηQ, and finally (lines 13-15) the S
network is distilled from Q using the distillation loss LD and learning rate ηS . In contrast, in standard
DQN training, we would not use the S network but would explore directly using the Q network and
would again train the Q network in the same way (line 9-12).
As both S and Q are expected to learn the underlying Q-function, both networks could be used at
testing time. However, since we will be training S with additional constraints, we will deploy S.
The intuition behind this algorithm is that the loss for the Q network has not been changed and thus
after being trained on sufficiently many random samples, the Q function will approach Q∗ regardless
of what the student learns. Theoretical results show that Q-Learning algorithms learn the correct
Q-function given a sufficiently random exploration agent [29–31, 19].
Assuming the student is capable of learning Q∗, it should be able to handle the concept-shift of Q
learning and incorporate the defense.
Ideally, the additional constraints will allow the student to achieve a better score when playing, so
that it explores higher reward paths.
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Compared to standard DQN training, the Student-DQN algorithm stores one additional network
and performs two neural network updates in a training step instead of one. Thus, the asymptotic
complexity of both training methods is the same. In §5 we empirically show that both systems run at
similar speeds in practice and exhibit comparable sample complexity.
Loss Student-DQN admits many possible choices for the distillation loss LD such as the mean
squared error (MSE) loss and the cross-entropy (CE) loss. That is, we can instantiate LD as:
LMSE(s, θQ, θS) = ||Q(s; θQ)− S(s; θS)||22
LCE(s, θQ, θS) = H
(
σ(S(s; θS)), arg max
a∈A
Q(s; θQ)a
)
(2)
For LMSE, the outputs of the S network are treated as Q-values, while in LCE, the output of S is treated
as the logits of a probability distribution. Both losses, along with a third based on KL-divergence,
were described in the context of policy distillation (LCE is the same as LNLL [21] up to scale). Note
that only LMSE will produce a student S that gives the same numerical result as Q. However, for the
other losses, S will still learn to take the same decisions as Q. In previous work on policy distillation
[21], the KL-based loss worked best, however we found the CE-based loss to be most suitable for
RS-DQN and we only discuss the adaption of LCE going forward.
We note that many of the extensions to the standard DQN algorithm can also be applied to RS-DQN
unchanged [32, 33]. However, extensions such as DuelingDQN[34] and NoisyNet [35] do require
small adaptations. We find that both of these extensions help training and further, the DuelingDQN
method is particularly critical when incorporating provably robust training.
Incorporating DuelingDQN DuelingDQN [34] introduces a specific Q network architecture,
which has been observed to achieve better learning performance. Specifically, DuelingDQN consisting
of two components: an advantage network A(s; θQ) : R|A| computing the relative advantage of the
|A| actions, and a value network V (s; θ) : R. These are combined to obtain
Q(s; θQ)a = V (s; θQ) + (A(s; θQ)a − 1|A|
∑
a′∈A
A(s; θQ)a′) (3)
where A denotes the action space. The advantage and value networks are defined to share the early
layers. We note that the output of A alone is sufficient to replicate a greedy policy based on Q.
However, the value network may be able to better discriminate between states and thus aid in training.
To incorporate DuelingDQN, both Q and S use the DuelingDQN-architecture described by Eq. (3).
To instantiate LD in Fig. 1 accordingly, we define
LDuelCE (s, θQ, θS) = H
(
σ(A(s; θS)), arg max
a
A(s; θQ)a
)
+ ||V (s; θS)− V (s; θQ)||22 (4)
as an adaption of LCE (Eq. (2)). In practice we also found a hybrid version of Eqs. (2) and (4) useful,
which uses the cross-entropy term as in Eq. (2) plus the loss on the value-networks as in Eq. (4).
Incorporating NoisyNet While -greedy exploration comes with theoretical guarantees, NoisyNet
[35], an extension to DQNs where the Q network learns mean and variance of Gaussian noise on the
weights in its dense layers, was prosposed. Using samples from the noise distributions as the source
of randomness during exploration, this exploration strategy allows agents to achieve higher scores.
In Student-DQN, only the student network S utilizes noise while the Q network uses non-noisy
weights. We notice that since S lags behind Q, it might require more diverse samples even when Q
has learned the correct behavior sufficiently well. We thus introduce an exploration noise constant
κ ≥ 1, which during exploration is multiplied with the weight variances.
4 Training Robust Student-DQN (RS-DQN)
The primary motivation for decoupling the DQN agent into a policy-student network S and a Q
network is to enable one to leverage additional constraints on S without strongly affecting learning of
the correct Q-function.
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Concretely, we address the problem of adversarial robustness in reinforcement learning by improving
the robustness of S. Specifically, we do this by instantiating LD in Fig. 1 with different defenses ( ):
adversarial training and provably robust training.
Incorporating Adversarial Training A variety of techniques have been developed for increasing
the robustness of neural networks, typically by training with adversarial examples [36, 37, 14].
An attack is utilized to deliberately produce adversarial examples, which are then used in training.
Rather than providing the Q network with adversarial examples as in [8], we only provide them to S.
Formally we do this by adapting the loss LCE (Eq. (2)):
LCE, def(s, θQ, θS) = H
(
σ(S(sd; θS)), arg max
a
Q(s; θQ)a
)
(5)
Here sd = PGD(s, arg maxa S(s; θS)a, S(·; θS)). While the computation of sd could be inlined
into Eq. (5) we refrain from this here so to clarify that the gradient is not propagated through the
PGD attack and sd is treated as a constant. For DuelingDQNs we calculate the advantage and value
separately, adapting Eq. (4):
LDuelCE, def(s, θQ, θS) = H
(
σ(A(sd; θS)), arg max
a
A(s; θQ)a
)
+ ||V (sd; θS)− V (s; θQ)||22 (6)
We note that while we explicitly use PGD here, our approach is not limited to the kind of attack that
is used to provide the adapted training samples.
Incorporating Provably Robustness Training While adversarial training produces empirically
robust networks, they are usually not provably robust, that is, it cannot be shown that the network
takes the same decision on all perturbed inputs that are reasonably close to the original input. Recently,
techniques to train networks to be certifiably robust have been introduced. Although initially limited
to small networks, multiple techniques have been developed since to train increasingly larger networks
to be provably robust [38, 39, 15, 40, 41, 16]. These techniques represent different points in the
spectrum of accuracy, training speed, certifiable robustness and experimental robustness.
Here we will show how to apply one of these methods [15] (DiffAI) as a defense ( ) for RS-DQN.
Using DiffAI’s Interval abstraction will allow us to effectively train on Bε(s) rather than s. The
DiffAI framework has been shown effective in training networks on the scale of DQNs used in Atari
games with minimal speed and memory overheads over standard, undefended training.
We use DiffAI to soundly propagate Bε(s) through the network S(·; θS) (via symbolic computation),
obtaining a symbolic element g as a result.
Because we are propagating Bε(s) symbolically, we can verify that for a target t, we have that
∀s¯ ∈ Bε(s). arg maxa S(s¯; θS)a = t. That is, in this case, we can certify that for any element inside
Bε(s) the agent S will pick the same action t.
Further, DiffAI defines a differentiable loss LI : Interval × N → R which takes as input the final
element g and a target (which is an action in our case) and allows for training the network on Bε(s).
Using this approach for training requires further modification of our loss function. We apply DiffAI
only to the DuelingDQN version of RS-DQN and thus extend LDuelCE -loss (Eq. (4)):
LProvable(s, θQ, θS) = ||V (s; θQ)− V (s; θS)||22 + λDLDiffAI(gA(s), arg max
a
A(s; θQ)a) (7)
Here, gA(s) denotes the symbolic propagation of Bε(s) through A(·; θS) and we have the loss
LDiffAI(gA(s), t) = λH
(
A(s; θS), t
)
+ (1− λ)LI(gA(s), t) which defines a linear combination of
the standard cross-entropy loss and the Interval loss LI for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Throughout the learning
process, we linearly anneal the value λ to shift more weight on provability.
We note that training the advantage network A(·; θS) to be robust is sufficient, as V (·; θS) can be
disregarded for making decisions and is only important for training.
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Table 1: Average evaluation scores over 15 games with and without training and test time attacks.
RS-DQN is defended with Adversarial Training.
no training attack TrainingPGD(k=1)
Game TestAttack DQN RS-DQN DQN RS-DQN
Freeway
none 33.00 29.33 21.73 32.93
TestPGD(k=4) 0.00 27.93 22.53 32.53
Bank Heist
none 222.00 112.66 220.00 238.66
TestPGD(k=4) 3.33 121.33 45.33 190.67
Pong
none 20.20 16.73 20.46 19.73
TestPGD(k=4) -20.73 15.87 -12.87 18.13
Boxing
none 95.87 93.27 84.80 80.67
TestPGD(k=4) -2.80 70.33 9.20 50.87
Road Runner
none 9406.67 11920.00 7066.67 12106.67
TestPGD(k=4) 0.00 9293.33 1266.67 5753.33
5 Experimental Evaluation
We now present our detailed evaluation of RS-DQN, in which we demonstrate that: (i) RS-DQN
instantiated with either adversarial training or provably robust training is capable of obtaining scores
similar to undefended DQN, (ii) RS-DQN instantiated with adversarial training is empirically robust
to PGD attacks in both training and evaluation, and (iii) RS-DQN can be trained to be provably robust
to ±1 pixel intensity changes on Atari game frames.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We tested our algorithm with 5 Atari games [42] from the OpenAI Gym [43].
Various combinations of extensions to the DQN algorithm – known to increase the performance of
the agent – are discussed in [44]. We implemented a subset of these for both DQN and RS-DQN:
Priority Replay [32], DoubleDQN [33], DuelingDQN [34], and NoisyNet [35]. The extensions of
these algorithms to RS-DQN were already discussed in Section §3.
We trained each agent for 4 million frames. All further parameters are provided in Table 3 in
Appendix A.
We implemented both RS-DQN and DQN in PyTorch [45] asynchronously [46]. On a machine with
a Nvidia 1080Ti, our implementations of DQN and Student-DQN, both play with a peek speed of
around 266 frames per second without additional attacks or defenses. A training run spanning 4M
frames takes between 4 to 30 hours depending on the exact parameters.
Attacks In our evaluation we use TrainingPGD(k=1) (attack during training) and TestPGD(k=4)
(attack during testing) as our attack schemes. TestPGD refers to the standard PGD attack as introduced
in §2.2. TrainingPGD refers to a similar attack where we flip the sign in Eq. (1) to be a − rather than
a +. The intuition behind this attack is that the action of the agent is reinforced rather than changed,
creating an illusion of successful training. However, when evaluated without this perturbation (i.e., in
the testing phase), the performance of the agent will deteriorate. For all attacks we use k as indicated
in the name and ε = 0.004, which roughly corresponds to changing a pixel by an 8-bit value ( 1255 ).
DQNs use an optimization where the input to the network s is not only the current frame but rather a
stack of the last four seen frames in grayscale (see [2] for details). We apply our attacks and defenses
to these 4-stacks of consecutive frames (of size 84× 84) used for training DQNs on Atari. While
single frame attacks conceptually fit the setting, we are primarily evaluating the effective of defenses
and thus choose the the more efficient 4-stack-attacks. In this evaluation we also always compute the
attack perturbation based on the exploring agent, which is Q for DQN and S for RS-DQN.
5.2 Empirically Robust RS-DQN
We now want to show the utility of defending with RS-DQN against attacks during training and
testing. Thus, we consider two agents, standard DQN and RS-DQN (which uses adversarial training).
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Table 2: Score and size the largest provable region Bε(s) around the state s. Both numbers are
averaged over 15 games. Values for ε are found via binary search and multiplied by 255 to correspond
to discrete pixel intensity changes. RS-DQN uses provably robust training.
Size εmax of the largest
Score provable interval Bεmax(s)
Game DQN RS-DQN DQN RS-DQN
Freeway 33.00 32.53 0.000 2.028
Bank Heist 222.00 154.00 0.001 1.373
Pong 20.20 5.13 0.000 1.075
Boxing 95.87 90.47 0.000 1.383
Road Runner 9406.67 5166.67 0.000 1.233
For RS-DQN, we instantiate LD with LDuelCE, def (utilizing the hybrid version of L
Duel
CE described at the
end of §3), where we defend with Adversarial Training using PGD with k = 1 and ε = 0.004.
During the training process of each agent, we played a validation episode every 10 episodes. In these
validation episodes, we disable noise due to NoisyNet and use -greedy exploration with  = 0.005.
We save the parameters that produce the agent with the highest score in an validation episode.
Afterwards, we evaluate DQN and RS-DQN by running another 15 evaluation games with the best
performing weight. The resulting average scores can be found in Table 1. The columns indicate
which algorithm is used and whether it was attacked during training, while the rows show different
attacks (none, TestPGD(k=4)) during testing. In Appendix C, we report additional numbers for
TestPGD(k=1) and TestPGD(k=50), as well as the standard deviation of the scores.
The two columns titled “no training attack” in Table 1 show that without a training attack, RS-DQN
achieves scores that are only slightly lower than DQN when no attack is applied at test time. However,
if TestPGD(k=4) is applied, DQN’s scores drop significantly while RS-DQN’s are robust.
In the presence of attacks during training (TrainingPGD(k=1)), we observe that DQN and RS-DQN
attain similar scores without a testing attack. With DQN, we see the effect of the training attack as the
attained scores are much lower than without a training attack, while RS-DQN behaves similarly in the
two scenarios. When evaluated in the presence of TestPGD(k=4), we again see RS-DQN remaining
robust while DQN scores drop.
5.3 Provably Robust RS-DQN
As introduced in §4, we can use DiffAI to prove robustness for a region of inputs, as well as train a
network to be more provable. We will now evaluate a RS-DQN agent, trained using LProvable (Eq. (7)).
A recent version of DiffAI [16] introduced a language for specifying detailed training procedures.
To enable reproducibility, we provide the full parameters of the training procedure expressed in this
language in Appendix B. Specifically, we start the learning process with λ = 1 (all weight on the
normal cross entropy loss) and linearly anneal it to be λ = 0 (all weight on the robustness training)
from frame 500000 to frame 4M. Similarly, we also anneal the size of the training region ε from 0 to
1
255 over the same time frame. Further we use λD = 1.
The agents were trained and evaluated as explained before. However, since we are increasing the
importance of the robustness loss with the frame number, we now use the weights after all of the
training procedure has completed. We play evaluation games, as before, but this time also measure
the size ε of the largest ball Bε(s), for which the action of the agent is robust within the ball — called
εmax. The values were found by binary search over ε between 0 and 1 with up to 20 iterations.
Table 2 reports the score and εmax averaged over 15 evaluation games. The DQN weights were taken
from the same highest scoring snapshot as in §5.2. We first observe that the RS-DQN agent, trained
with DiffAI, obtains similar but slightly lower scores than DQN. This is to be expected as it is a
common pattern, observed in robust classifiers, that (provable) robustness comes at the cost of some
accuracy. However, inspecting the found εmax, we see that the RS-DQN agent is much more robust.
The εmax values in Table 2 have been multiplied by 255, to be on the same scale as discrete intensity
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changes of pixels in the image. Obtaining values above 1 means each pixel value in the frame can be
changed by ±1 and the network — provably — will still select the same action.
6 Conclusion
We introduced an extension to the DQN training algorithm that enables us to incorporate state-of-the-
art defenses such as adversarial or provably robust training into the learning process. The key idea is
to split the learning process among two networks, one of which aims to learn a correct Q-function
and another that aims to explore the environment robustly with respect to perturbations. We showed
that this algorithm clearly outperforms DQNs in terms of both, adversarial and provable robustness.
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Supplementary Material for
Online Robustness Training for Deep Q Learning
A Hyperparameters
In Table 3 we provide the hyperparameters used for the experiments throughout the paper. We found
the parameters by starting from the parameters in RainbowDQN [44] and manually tweaking them
for a fast training DQN. We then used the same parameters including network architecture (plus
additional RS-DQN-specific parameters) for RS-DQN. Further, we found training the algorithm to
expensive for automatic hyperparameter tuning (e.g., Bayesian Optimization).
Table 3: Hyperparameters used in the experiments. → indicates linear annealing.
FreeWay Bank Heist Pong Boxing Road Runner
Optimizer Adam
Adam- 0.00015
Learning rate ηQ 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Learning rate ηS 0.0002
Batch-size 32
Clip reward to sign True
Double Q-learning True
Game played for 4000000 frames
Frame-Stack 4
Discount factor γ 0.99
Use Priority Replay True
Priority Replay α (or ω) 0.5
Target net Sync m every 2000 frames
NoisyNet Explore Constant κ 4
Frames before learning 80000
Size of replay buffer 200000
-greedy exploration 1.0→ 0.0 over 20000 frames
B DiffAI Command
We use the following invocation to train the advantage part of RS-DQN:
LinMix ( a= P o i n t ( ) ,
b=InSamp ( Lin ( 0 , 1 , 3500000 , 500000) ,
w=Lin ( 0 , 1 . 0 / 2 5 5 . 0 , 3500000 , 5 0 0 0 0 0 ) ) ,
bw=Lin ( 0 , 0 . 5 , 3500000 , 5 0 0 0 0 0 ) )
We pass the current number of frames played as the progress counter for Lin to DiffAI.
C Further Evaluation Results
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Table 4: Average evaluation scores (± standard deviation) over 15 games with and without training
and test time attacks. RS-DQN is defended with Adversarial Training. We note here that Pong
and Boxing allow negative scores. Further, the high variance in Bank Heist and Road Runner can
explained as these games have multiple levels. Usually the agent only learns to solve the first one.
When arriving at the next level (in the next episode). We see that usually the agent obtains a good
score in one level equal to roughly twice the mean and then zero (or close to it) in the next, yielding
the mean and high standard deviation.
no training attack TrainingPGD(k=1)
Game TestAttack DQN RS-DQN DQN RS-DQN
Freeway
none 33.00± 0.65 29.33± 0.98 21.73± 1.70 32.93± 0.70
TestPGD(k=1) 0.00± 0.00 28.40± 0.99 23.07± 2.49 32.20± 0.86
TestPGD(k=4) 0.00± 0.00 27.93± 1.16 22.53± 2.53 32.53± 1.06
TestPGD(k=50) 0.00± 0.00 28.13± 1.77 21.20± 1.52 31.80± 1.15
Bank Heist
none 222.00± 239.23 112.66± 165.37 220.00± 213.47 238.66± 253.03
TestPGD(k=1) 17.33± 16.67 97.33± 148.10 138.67± 192.42 199.33± 265.58
TestPGD(k=4) 3.33± 4.88 121.33± 172.49 45.33± 50.97 190.67± 223.49
TestPGD(k=50) 2.67± 4.58 160.00± 197.84 42.00± 111.43 132.00± 174.60
Pong
none 20.20± 2.85 16.73± 2.89 20.46± 1.06 19.73± 0.96
TestPGD(k=1) −21.00± 0.00 16.20± 2.86 −5.80± 4.16 16.33± 4.32
TestPGD(k=4) −20.73± 0.46 15.87± 2.32 −12.87± 4.88 18.13± 2.166
TestPGD(k=50) −21.00± 0.00 16.80± 3.52 −13.67± 3.46 18.67± 1.29
Boxing
none 95.87± 8.00 93.27± 6.96 84.80± 10.62 80.67± 13.32
TestPGD(k=1) 7.40± 10.63 62.87± 28.96 10.60± 12.05 58.73± 17.28
TestPGD(k=4) −2.80± 4.44 70.33± 21.70 9.20± 13.15 50.87± 25.30
TestPGD(k=50) 3.80± 7.14 66.93± 26.49 8.87± 14.03 59.40± 18.90
Road Runner
none 9406.67± 13596.14 11920.00± 16798.99 7066.67± 9685.60 12106.67± 15816.74
TestPGD(k=1) 0.00± 0.00 11560.00± 12354.44 1313.33± 1472.05 5180.00± 6162.47
TestPGD(k=4) 0.00± 0.00 9293.33± 12067.04 1266.67± 984.64 5753.33± 7632.25
TestPGD(k=50) 0.00± 0.00 7660.00± 10213.21 1246.67± 1100.56 5146.67± 7310.55
Table 5: Score and size ε of the largest provable region Bε(s) around the state s. Both numbers are
averaged (± standard deviation) over 15 games. Values for ε are found via binary search. RS-DQN
uses provably robust training. For a discussion for standard deviation see Table 4
Score εmax
Game DQN RS-DQN DQN RS-DQN
Freeway 33.00± 0.65 32.53± 0.92 3.39 · 10−7 ± 3.78 · 10−8 7.95 · 10−3 ± 5.01 · 10−5
Bank Heist 222.00± 239.23 154.00± 190.18 5.55 · 10−6 ± 2.49 · 10−6 5.38 · 10−3 ± 1.53 · 10−3
Pong 20.20± 2.85 5.13± 14.01 6.71 · 10−7 ± 1.49 · 10−7 4.21 · 10−3 ± 2.13 · 10−4
Boxing 95.87± 8.00 90.47± 8.68 1.75 · 10−7 ± 1.93 · 10−8 5.42 · 10−3 ± 5.61 · 10−4
Road Runner 9406.67± 13596.14 5166.67± 5714.98 1.30 · 10−7 ± 1.06 · 10−7 4.38 · 10−3 ± 2.43 · 10−4
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